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Eleanor Spaventa
1
 
Abuse of Law and Free Movement of Workers 
Comments on the paper by Katja Ziegler 
 
 
The excellent paper by Katja Ziegler examines the relevance of the ‘abuse of law’ 
doctrine in the field of the free movement of workers. In this respect, the main claim 
put forward by Ziegler, a claim that finds me in total agreement, is that the category of 
abuse of law is factually irrelevant in this field. Thus, despite the fact that the Court 
has indicated that in theory the provisions on the free movement of workers, and those 
on the free movement of persons more generally,
2
 might not help an abusive 
claimant,
3
 it has never applied this category to a specific case.
4
 According to the case 
law of the Court, the notion of abuse implies an ‘improper use’ of the Treaty 
freedoms, to circumvent national law. Thus, the notion of abuse seems to imply the 
relevance of a psychological element, so that the reason why the right-holder 
exercises her right becomes relevant to the assessment of whether there is an abuse 
capable of projecting the factual situation outside the protection afforded by the 
Treaty. However, in the case of the free movement provisions, the Court has 
repeatedly, and consistently, declared the irrelevance of the reasons, the psychological 
element, that might have led the individual to exercise her rights. Thus, for instance 
the fact that the right to move and work in another Member State is exercised with the 
sole aim of triggering the Treaty so as to benefit of the rights for family members of 
Community nationals, which is to say with the intention to circumvent national 
migration law, is immaterial to the enjoyment of such rights.
5
     
 
In her paper, Ziegler identifies four possible reasons that might explain the irrelevance 
of the abuse category in the field of free movement of persons. First of all, the non-
existence of a principle of abuse of law, which ‘could be merely an umbrella term for 
certain factual scenarios. This might be particularly relevant in relation to corporate 
tax law, where the concept of abuse might usefully be employed to limit the 
possibility for corporate entities to exploit gaps in the legislation by simply being 
always a step ahead than the legislative process
6
. In this respect, abuse of law would 
                                                 
1
 Durham European Law Institute and Durham Law School. I am grateful to the organisers and 
participants to the conference for an interesting and lively discussion.  
2
 Neither Ziegler nor I are concerned with the free movement of corporate entities; therefore the 
expression ‘free movement of persons’ will be used to indicate the free movement of individuals.  
3
 E.g.  
4
 See e.g. Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-
9925; Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607. The 
issue of abuse might be relevant in the case of the instrumental use of the free movement provisions 
with the sole purpose of eluding  national tax legislation; on this point see AG Geelhoed’s Opinion in 
Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[2007] ECR I-2107.  
5
 This was to a certain extent established in Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie[1982] ECR 
1035; and confirmed in Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department Akrich [2003] ECR 
I-9607. 
6
 For an interesting comment about abuse of law in tax cases, particularly useful for non-tax lawyers, 
see Confédération Fiscale Européenne Opinion Statement of the CFE ECJ Task Force on the Concept 
of Abuse in European Law, based on the Judgments of the European Court of Justice delivered in the 
files of tax law, (November 2007), available on http://european-tax-adviser.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2007/11/cfe-opinion-statement-on-abuse-in-european-law_nov-2007.pdf. The paper 
also points at a possible distinction between abuse of rights (mainly to the detriment of a private party) 
and abuse of law.      
be a useful tool to avoid the age-old problem of passing legislation through a 
cumbersome and long legislative process only to find that companies having access to 
good legal advice find a way around it. In this respect, the abuse of law category 
might well indicate the application of a ‘sui generis’ mandatory requirement, in that 
the imposition by the Member State of its rules is a legitimate and proportionate way 
to protect an aim compatible with Community law (e.g. the need to combat fiscal 
elusion). 
 
Should one not adhere to the claim that ‘abuse of law’ is a non-existent legal category, 
Ziegler puts forward alternative reasons why the abuse of law doctrine has never been 
applied by the Court in relation to the free movement of workers. Thus, the Court’s 
caselaw in the field of the free movement of persons is driven by a very strong 
integrationist rationale; in interpreting the rights that individuals derive from the free 
movement provisions the Court is also driven by a citizenship rationale; and finally, 
the fact that the case law in this field is driven by fundamental rights consideration.  
 
Some remarks on abuse of individual rights 
 
And yet, as pointed out by Ziegler in the last part of her paper, the real issue revolves 
around a more fundamental question: is the notion of abuse of workers’ rights a 
legally defined (and legally helpful) category? And in many respects, this is exactly 
the broader question proposed by Rita de la Feira as the theme of the conference 
which gave rise to the papers collected in this volume: to what extent can a right 
really be abused? And what does such an abuse consist of?  
 
Generally, it is not crystal clear that the notion of abuse is legally persuasive: after all, 
the doctrine of abuse serves the purpose of transforming something that would be 
otherwise legal into unlawful behaviour. And, as pointed out by ,
7
 the transformation 
from legality to illegality happens via means of judicial interpretation in the case at 
issue and therefore might raise problems of legal certainty as well as democratic 
accountability.   
 
In any event, the reasons which might justify this metamorphosis are also not well 
defined. In this respect, the Court refers to the possibility for a Member State to 
‘prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by 
the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent 
individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of 
Community law’.8 Thus, it is unclear whether the category of abuse of law would ever 
be relevant, at least in relation to non-corporate entities, beyond the instances of fraud, 
which maybe would be best kept distinct in order to avoid confusion.  
 
Fraudulent behaviour might well exclude the individual from the scope ratione 
personae or ratione materiae of the Treaty. For instance, marriages of convenience are 
excluded, and were excluded before Directive 2004/38,
9
 from the scope of the Treaty 
                                                 
7
 Cross reference needed. 
8
 Joined Cases C-151 and 152/04 Claude Nadin, Nadin Lux-SA and Jean Pascal Durré [2005] ECR I-
11203, para 45, emphasis added..  
9
 Article 35 Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 
and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
simply because, even though they might be otherwise valid, those are not relevant 
marriages for Community law purposes. Similarly, the principle according to which 
individuals cannot exploit the Treaty so as to benefit twice from welfare provisions 
simply translates in the fact that there is no right in Community law to double an 
entirely overlapping welfare provision.
10
 For this reason, there is no possibility to 
raise a Community law defence in relation to fraudulent behaviour. In this respect, the 
fact that Article 35 of Directive 2004/38 mentions both abuse and fraud is not in my 
opinion a sufficient reason to hold that the two are conceptually distinct.  
 
More fundamentally, it should be queried whether the concept of abuse of law can 
ever be relevant in relation to the exercise of individual rights. Thus, for instance, 
consider the situation at issue in Akrich.
11
 Mr and Mrs Akrich moved from the UK to 
Ireland, and then back to the United Kingdom, with the sole purpose of triggering the 
Treaty so that Mr Akrich would gain a residence permit pursuant to the Singh case 
law.
12
 Leaving aside the fact that since Mr Akrich was unlawfully resident in the UK 
the Court excluded the applicability of Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68,
13
 it was 
made clear in that case that the motives that led Mrs Akrich to Ireland and back were 
irrelevant in assessing the legal situation of the couple.
14
 Indeed, it would have been 
untenable to hold that since Mrs Akrich wanted to take advantage of one of the 
ancillary rights expressly conferred by Community law, and used the primary rights to 
achieve that end, then she should be excluded from the scope of Community law. In 
other words, it is unlikely that the fact that an individual exercises her rights in order 
to be able to enjoy rights conferred upon her by Community law should matter in 
defining the scope of such rights. Or else, it would mean that intention to enjoy rights 
might disqualify the claimant from enjoyment of such rights.  
 
Furthermore, it would be illogical to take motivation into account: there are endless 
variables that can influence individual choices, from mere economic ones to more 
individual ones such as personal preferences, the location of family and friends, etc. It 
would be impossible to find a common rationale capable of determining how and 
when those personal preferences are relevant in defining the legitimate or abusive 
exercise of the rights at issue; and when such personal motivations are irrelevant. And 
in any event, it would be difficult to reconcile the notion of abuse with the 
hermeneutic principles established by the Court. Thus, the free movement provisions 
have always been given a teleological interpretation, which is aimed not only at 
facilitating movement, but also at not deterring the use of both primary Treaty rights 
and rights contained in secondary legislation (which in any event usually derive 
                                                                                                                                            
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, [2004] OJ L 229/35; see Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] ECR 
I-9607. 
10
 E.g. see Article 12 Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons, to self-employed persons ad to members of their families moving within the Community, as 
amended. Consolidated version [1997] OJ L28/1, and http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/consleg/pdf/1971/en_1971R1408_do_001.pdf. 
11
 Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607. 
12
 In Case C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265 the Court held that a British national returning from 
Germany to the UK after having worked there was protected by the Treaty and the relevant secondary 
legislation so that her husband gained residency rights in the UK.  
13
 Regulation 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community OJ Sp. Ed. 1968 
L257/2, p.475. This case law has now been reversed, see Case C-127/08 Metock, judgment of 25 July 
2008, nyr. 
14
 Case C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607, paras 55 
and 56.  
directly from Treaty rights).
15
 It would be therefore difficult to justify the imposition 
of limits, which might well appear arbitrary, to the use of those rights by focusing on 
a pre-defined (by whom?) notion of the manner in which those rights should be used. 
 
This is all the more the case given that the interpretation of the free movement 
provisions espoused by the Court has gone much beyond the (supposed) intention of 
the Treaty drafters. Thus, in a dynamic and evolving system like the Community one, 
it would be very difficult to limit the rights granted by the Treaty by relying on the 
fact that the claimant is not exercising the right in a manner which is compatible with 
the reasons for which the right was originally granted. After all, the Court’s 
interpretation has been developing according to an ever changing telos (market 
integration first, constitutional citizenship now) which in some instances openly 
disregarded the political will expressed in primary and secondary legislation. Thus for 
instance, consider not only the move from discrimination to barrier to movement,
16
 
with all that that implies in terms of repartition of regulatory competences,
17
 but also 
those cases in which the Court pushed the scope of Community law beyond its letter. 
One could usefully recall the health care case law,
 18
 where the Court accepted that 
Article 49 EC could be interpreted so as to confer a right to seek health care abroad 
(subject to limits imposed by he Court itself) beyond what allowed by Regulation 
1408/71; or the citizenship case law on welfare benefits for non-economic migrants.
19
 
It is difficult to maintain that the limitations in Regulation 1408/71, the limitation of 
the scope of the Treaty to cover only services provided for remuneration in Article 50 
EC, or the limitations to the principle of equal treatment provided for in Article 24(2) 
of Directive 2004/38, were not intended to curtail the possibility to use the Treaty 
freedoms to gain access to health care and benefits respectively. 
 
Given the ever evolving scope of the free movement provisions, it would be near 
impossible to draw a line between abusive use of the free movement provisions and 
non-abusive use. And if such a line were to be drawn it might appear rather arbitrary. 
Thus, the fact that we find references to the concept of abuse both in the case law and 
in Directive 2004/38, might indicate simply the fact that, as said above, in instances in 
                                                 
15
 See the case law on barriers that make movement less attractive and the general definition of barrier 
given in Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano[1995] 
ECR I-4165, para 37. 
16
 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano[1995] ECR 
I-4165; Case C-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc 
Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921; Case C-60/00 M Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home department 
[2002] ECR I-6279. 
17
 See generally N Bernard Multilevel Governance in the European Union (Kluwer Law International, 
2002), esp. ch. 2; and more specifically E Spaventa ‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non-
Economic) European Constitution’ (2004) CMLRev 743-773. 
18
 Cf Article 22 Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71. with the health care cases, e.g. C-157/99 B S M 
Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen 
[2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ 
Zorgverzekeringen UA, and van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappi ZAO Zorgverzekeringen 
[2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325. 
19
 E.g. Case C-224/98 M N D’Hoop v Office national d’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191; Case C-138/02 
Collins [2004] ECR I-2703; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119. The ruling in Bdar might have 
been partially overruled by the ruling in Case C-158/07 Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie 
Beheer Groep, judgment of 18
th
 November 2008, nyr. 
which the individual is trying to rely on Community law to shield herself from the 
consequences of fraudulent, and therefore either illegal or borderline illegal, 
behaviour Community law cannot be used as a defence.  
 
Abuse of law in horizontal situations 
 
A more interesting question might arise in relation to the possibility of invoking the 
abuse of law doctrine in relation to horizontal situations. As pointed out by Ziegler¸ it 
is not unusual for fundamental rights documents to contain an ‘anti-abuse’ clause 
according to which the exercise of fundamental rights cannot be aimed at the 
destruction of the rights recognised in those documents.
20
 Again, it is a matter of 
debate whether the ‘anti-abuse’ provisions delimit the scope of the rights granted by 
such documents, or rather imply a self-standing legal category.
21
 Usually the doctrine, 
or inherent limitation as the case might be, applies both to vertical and horizontal 
situations. In particular, it might be used to prevent a party from using a right, for 
instance freedom of expression, in ways which go against the very purpose of the 
rights granted; or in order to allow a State to regulate such rights to avoid ‘abuses’. 
For instance, the European Court of Human Rights has accepted that Member States 
might legitimately prevent the expression of ideas, such as racist or fascist ideas, that 
would undermine the very values which the Convention seeks to protect.
22
    
 
In relation to the free movement of workers provisions it is not clear whether the 
doctrine of abuse might be relevant in relation to horizontal situations.  This question 
seems particularly relevant following the horizontal effect of the free movement of 
persons provisions. In Angonese,
23
 the Court clarified that the prohibition of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality is a mandatory principle of Community law 
which binds also private parties. In the more recent cases of Viking and Laval,
24
 the 
Court accepted that the Treaty free movement provisions might impose a positive 
duty on trade Unions to refrain from taking collective action against trans-frontier 
employers; or action with the aim of preventing an employer from exercising its 
Treaty free movement rights.    
 
The horizontal boundaries of the free movement provisions have yet to be properly 
defined: however, it is not impossible to foresee situations in which claimants might 
attempt to artificially bring themselves within the scope of the Treaty in order to gain 
an undue advantage against a private party.
25
 Take for instance the case of Evans: that 
case concerned litigation between ex-husband and wife as to the use of fertilised eggs, 
                                                 
20
 E.g. Article 54 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be 
interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for herein’. Similar provisions are found in Article 17 of the European 
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and in Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
21
 For a comparative discussion see E. Reid ‘The Doctrine of Abuse of Rights: Perspectives from a 
mixed jurisdiction’ EJCL (October 2004) http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-2.html. 
22
 E.g. Garaudy v France (Decision of 24 June 2003, Appl. No. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts). 
23
 C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139. 
24
 Case C-438/05, The International Workers’ Federation and the Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767. 
25
 This is common in competition law as well as in vertical cases in relation to free movement of 
persons; see e.g. the rather artificial intra-Community link in Case C-60/00 M Carpenter v Secretary of 
State for the Home department [2002] ECR I-6279. 
when the ex-husband withdrew consent for insemination. In that case, Community 
law had not been triggered and therefore the balancing act as to the mutual rights and 
obligations of the two parties rested with national law, and with the European Court 
of Human Rights.
26
 However, one could ask oneself whether if Ms Evans had sought 
implantation of the fertilised eggs in France, with the sole purpose of triggering the 
intra-Community element and the jurisdiction of the Court, that would qualify as an 
abusive use of the free movement provisions.     
  
In the present writer’s opinion, even in such an extreme case, it would not be a matter 
of abusive exercise but rather of defining in more precise way the extent to which 
individuals can rely on their right to move during the course of proceedings against 
another person, when their right to move is only tangentially relevant. Thus, in the 
hypothetical case of a Ms Evans in France, the real issue is not that of an abuse of 
rights but rather it is a constitutional issue as to the respective scope of application of 
Community and national law. In other words, the right to have IVF treatment in 
France would not be abusively exercised, but rather the ECJ would have to decide 
whether to impose its own fundamental rights standards or rather leave it to national 
law to balance the conflicting fundamental rights.
27
   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
As argued by Ziegler, it seems doubtful that the doctrine of abuse of law is a legally 
useful concept in relation to the free movement of workers. Rather, the cases in which 
abuse of law might be invoked can be grouped in to two categories: first, those cases 
in which the claimant has engaged in fraudulent behaviour which excludes the 
application of the Treaty ratione personae (e.g. marriages of convenience, where the 
spouse is not a spouse for Community law purposes), or ratione materiae (e.g. cases 
involving double benefits claims). Secondly, the expression ‘abuse of law’ might 
serve as an all encompassing safety net that can be relied upon in exceptional 
circumstances to justify a limitation of the Treaty rights. Thus, it could be seen as a 
‘sui generis’ mandatory requirement, that indicate nothing more than the legitimate 
and proportionate application of a rule which is itself compatible with Community 
law. Overall then, at least in relation to the free movement of workers and physical 
persons more generally, the concept of abuse far from being a self-standing legal 
category seems to be a tool which might be used to delimit the rights at issue.           
 
       
                                                 
26
 Evans v UK (Application No 6339/05; judgment of 10 April 2007). 
27
 On this point see E Spaventa ‘Federalization versus Centralization: Tensions in Fundamental Rights 
Discourse in the European Union’ in Dougan and Currie (eds) 50 Years of the European Treaties 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009), p. 343. 
